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1. Universal versus particular law 
In an amendment of 1302 to the Norwegian Code of the Realm of 1274, king Håkon V 
Magnusson states in the preamble:  
 
Sumt man fylgia lagum kirkunnar oc keisarens, en uera skildi rikinu til mykils hafka, oc allu folkenu til 
mykilla unada er Þat byggia. Nu saker Þess at uer iattadom gudi i vigslu vara, at uer skuldum Þau logh 
halda oc haldazt leta sem hin helgi Olafr konongr hof oc hans retter eftir komandar hafa sidan til sett og 
samtyct.
1
 
 
The Norwegian king between 1299 and 1319 hence claimed in the preamble that Roman and 
Canon law had been harmful for the realm, and the laws to be observed by the inhabitants 
were those made by St. Olaf and his descendants to the throne.  That the preamble is a piece 
of political propaganda, ignoring that Roman and Canon law had to a great extent shaped the 
legal framework of the Norwegian state of King Håkon V, and ignoring that King Olaf II was 
not formally a saint, is not up for discussion here. The point is instead that the Norwegian 
King in 1302 preferred what he considered Norwegian law to Roman and Canon law, and that 
he did so in Old Norse and not Latin.  
 
Historically good law, meaning law enjoying a high esteem and large authority, has in Europe 
in general not been native, local, regional or national law. Rather, it has been law with 
universal aspirations. Law with universal aspirations are law that are not confined to just one 
jurisdiction, but enjoy validity across boundaries of different kinds, and are hence not 
particular to specific cultures. Such law with universal aspirations has to be transmitted by a 
language sharing the same aspirations and cultural independence. King Håkon V was hence 
out of tune with history when it came to both criteria for good law and transmittance 
language. 
 
Even though this had been a dominating view in most of European legal history, is has not 
been unchallenged. Rejections of law with universal aspirations, like Roman and Canon law 
in the Middle Ages, and Natural law in the Early Modern Period, was rarely on the agenda 
before 1814. But a claim that such law ought to be adjusted to the nature and culture where 
applied, went at this point in history from being the exception to the rule. And instead of 
adhering to a language with universal aspirations, the change in expectations to good law was 
accompanied with a claim that law ought to be transmitted in the language of those subjects to 
the law. With this backdrop, King Håkon V is suddenly not alone any more. 
                                                 
1
 Lovgivningen efter Kong Magnus Haakonssøns Død 1280 indtil 1387. ed. by R. Keyser. Vol. III, Norges 
(Christiania: Chr. Grøndahl) 1949: 45. 
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This historical competition between universal and particular law will in this article be traced 
about a thousand years back in time. Still, it is a theme of an everlasting actuality, and is 
embedded in the case Lautsi and others v. Italy.2 The essence of the case is if the Italian state 
rightfully could have a crucifix in every public classroom, all according to royal decrees from 
1924 and 1928, or if there exist a duty for European states to provide religion neutral public 
education. Among other things, the Italian state backed their argument by references to Italian 
history, tradition and culture. The other party relied on universal human rights.  
 
The case was first treated in November 2009 by a Chamber in the European Court of Human 
Rights, which ruled on a “duty to respect neutrality in the exercise of public authority, 
particularly in the field of education.” The Italian state requested the case to be referred to a 
Grand Chamber, who ruled in March 2011 that  
 
the mere display of a voiceless testimonial of a historical symbol, so emphatically part of the European 
heritage, in no way amounts to “teaching”, nor does it undermine in any meaningful manner the 
fundamental right of parents to determine what, if any, religious orientation their children are to follow. 
 
After taking a beating in the Chamber, culture and history hence made a comeback in the 
Grand Chamber.  
 
Lautsi and Others v. Italy display not only a core conflict in European legal history, but also 
the very idea of the European Human Rights: They are universal, at least in a European 
context, and at the same time each state is rendered a margin of appreciation when applying 
them. The same is the case with the EU-law, which is the other set of norm with universal 
aspiration in Europe today, where margin of discretion is the term bridging the universal and 
particular. But the language question is somewhat treated differently with relation to the two – 
in the EU-law system all languages of the member states are applied in court and in 
judgements, at the same time as only French is the deliberation language, while within the 
European Human Rights system only French and English are chosen as universal legal 
languages.  
 
Where does these notions of law as universal and particular origin from? What events have 
led to the present day situation in Europe where law with universal aspiration are the 
exception to rule of the national law governing each nation? And what role have language 
played in the conflict between the two? Let us begin our journey to answer these questions in 
the Middle Ages. 
 
2. Universal versus particular law in the Middle Ages  
A thousand years ago Europa was a legal patchwork of local and regional law. Each realm, 
each county, each town and village, even each small cluster of houses, would have their own 
legal norms. The more the applier of norms had participated in making them, or could identify 
with the makers of them, the more likely it was that they would actually be applied. Hence, 
laws of a realm would more likely be applied at the king`s castles than in faraway towns and 
villages.  
                                                 
2 European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber: Lautsi and Others v. Italy  
 (Application no. 30814/06) 18.03.2011.  
(http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=lautsi%20%7C%20
others&sessionid=94602948&skin=hudoc-en). 
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This state of affairs what concerns law in early Medieval Europa was not much different from 
the state of affairs what concerned politics – it was a patchwork of crossing interests with no 
real centralized state power to unify them.3 Still, the ideal was unity. This ideal stemmed from 
the idea that the Roman Empire had been a unity which gave peace and stability to Europe. 
We are in this case talking about as much a historical truth as when the Norwegian king in 
1302 disregarded the importance of Roman and Canon law, and made King Olaf II the origin 
of Norwegian law. This image of a political and legal unity of the past was, though, a very 
powerful image. But its powers were first unleashed in the 12
th
 century in the city Bologna in 
Northern Italy. 
 
Large parts of western Europa entered at the latter part of the early Midle Ages a period of 
economical progress, with a subsequent growth of cities and public administration.4 The legal 
norms needed to support this growth was by and by found in Roman law. Roman law had 
never ceased to play a role in the former territory of the Roman Empire. But both in the east 
and west the competence to apply this complicated and immense body of law had diminished 
with the western part of the empire in Late Antiquity. In the east the loss of legal competence 
was met with a rearrangement of the law under emperor Justinian, doing away with most of it 
and compiling the rest between 529 and 534 in Institutiones, an introduction to Roman law, 
Codex, a collection of legislation, and Digesta, a collection of examples of appliance of 
Roman law. After the death of Justinian his own legislation was compiled in Novellae in 565. 
This new collection of Roman law was even introduced in the western empire`s provinces in 
Italy. But the body of law, later known as Corpus juris civilis, was to be forgotten till this new 
growth of the economy, the cities and the public administration in the 11
th
 and 12
th
 century.  
 
Ignerius has been given the honour of rediscovering Roman law. Behind the myths we simply 
find a lawyer striving to find good arguments to present in court, and who found them in 
Roman law. His success drew the attention of young, ambitious lawyers who came to study 
his technic of pulling out arguments from the old sources. The four doctors Bulgarus, 
Martinus, Jacobus and Hugo was according to the myth his students, and would be the first to 
establish a university study of law, where Roman law in Corpus juris civilis was the main 
object of the study.5 With the structuring and harmonization of Roman law of Accursius in his 
Glossa ordinaria from about 1235, this body of law was made accessible and ready for the 
unwrapping of law makers and appliers.  
 
Another object of study at the emerging universities was canon law. The body of law 
developed by the Church was not only the fundament of Church jurisdiction, but also served 
as a model for vernacular law makers and appliers due to its technical qualities, especially 
within procedural law. With the restructuring and harmonization of this body of law by 
Gratian and others in the mid-12
th
 century,6 Canon law was ready to sweep over Western 
Europe.  
 
                                                 
3
 See Paolo Grossi, A History of European Law  (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell) 2010: 1-19.  
4
 See Grossi, A History of European Law, 19-35. 
5
 Richard Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, volum I: Foundations (Blackwell, 
Oxford) 1995: 273-282, and Anders Winroth, «The Teaching of Law in the Twelfth Century», Law and 
Learning in the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the Second Carlsberg Academy Conference on Medieval Legal 
History 2005, Helle Vogt, Mia Münster-Swendsen (eds.) (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing) 2006: 41-55. 
6
 Anders Winroth, The making of Gratian's Decretum (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press) 
2000: 5-8 and 193-195 (for a brief summary). 
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The student body and the law they studied was as universal as the Roman Empire had been in 
Antiquity and the Church was in the Middle Ages. And universal bodies of law have to be in 
and thought in a universal language. That is, a language that can cross the same boarders as 
the laws and the students transmitting them. The universal language of the Middle Ages was 
Latin. Still, both the universal character of the bodies of law and the language they were 
transmitted in would be challenged. 
 
Already in the 12
th
 century at least Canon law would be thought with a margin of 
appreciation/discression. It was a recognized principle that it had to be adjusted when applied. 
Already Isidor of Sevilla, bishop at the Visigothic kingdom at the Iberian Peninsula, stressed 
in his Etymologiae in the Seventh Century, that good laws where those adjusted to specific 
factors. Factors even being outside the moral principles surrounding law.7 This idea would 
prove most important to the spread of Canon law, because from it followed a fairly pragmatic 
attitude that enabled rather an appropriation than a reception of law.8 It went so far that 
William of Ockham in the early 14
th
 century protested against the justification of faith – the 
practical orientation of jurists when making and applying law got in the way of universal 
truths of Christendom.9  
 
Already with the making of the glosses, the explanations to the paragraphs and terms in the 
Roman law texts, Roman law was read in light of, and hence adjusted, to the present. After 
the production of Glossa ordinaria, the focus in Roman law shifted from the text to the 
appliance of it, and it was even further adjusted. And hence, Roman law was, as Canon law, 
more an appropriated than merely received. This way Renaissance Romanists would be 
occupied with bringing Roman law back to the original texts, and doing away with all the 
remaking’s of the pragmatic transmittance.10 Francois Rabelais even made this a theme in his 
famous “Pantagruel” from the first half of the 16th century.11 
 
It is symptomatic that it was not only the laws that in the renaissance were perceived 
vulgarized through the transmittance, but also the language they were transmitted in. Even 
worse, in some countries Latin was not used as a legal language at all. This would be typical 
for the parts of Europe where especially Roman, but also Canon law was more a raw material 
for local law making and appliance. This of course counts for many a local court, where both 
knowledge of learned law and Latin was more than scares.12 But the further away you got 
from Rome, the less Latin was used in higher courts and in law making as well. England 
being one example frequently pointed at,13 where French was used as a legal language, later 
known as Law French, while Latin was frequently used when applying Canon law. Norway 
are in some ways an even more extreme example, since the vast amount of laws produced 
                                                 
7
 Isidorus Hispalensis, The Etymologies of Isidor of Sevilla (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 199 
no. xxi.  
8
 See James a. Coriden, “The Canonical Soctrine of Reception”, The Jurist, volume 50 1990: 60-62.  
9
 John Scott, “William of  Ockham and the Lawyers Revisited”, Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100-
1540 – Essays in Honour of John O. Ward, eds. Constant J. Mewsa, Cary J. Nederman, Rodney M. Thomson 
(Brepols: Turnhout) 2003: 169-182. 
10
 Grossi, A History of European Law, 54-58. 
11
 Theodore Ziolkowski, The mirror of justice – Literary reflections of legal crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press) 1997: 134-143. 
12
 See Bernd Kannowski. “The Sachsenspiegel and Its Gloss in Context of European Legal History as 
Exemplified by Criminal Procedure”, Law and Learning in the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the Second 
Carlsberg Academy Conference on Medieval Legal History 2005, Helle Vogt, Mia Münster-Swendsen (eds.) 
(København: DJØF Publishing) 2006: 193-206. 
13
 Heikki Mattila, Comparative Legal Linguistics (London: Ashgate) 2006: 225-228. 
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were all in old Norse.14 This counts for the Norwegian Code of the Realm of 1274, the fairly 
identical Code of the Cities of 1276, the somewhat identical Icelandic Code of 1281, and the 
Administrative Code of 1277, and the 77 known pieces of different kind of legislation issued 
after the making of these codes till 1319, when the law making activity would by and by slow 
down due to a series of factors. Even the Church laws of 1277 were also written in vernacular 
Norwegian.  
 
As a rule of thumb, the less latinification of the legal language, the less the Roman and Canon 
law influence was. If we again look at Norwegian legal history, the Roman law influence are 
noticeable, but still fairly vague due to Roman Law being a raw material for reworking  and 
the passing and applying of local law. From the early Middle Ages, when the country recently 
had been Christianised and the Church was still weak as an institution, Canon law did not 
apply in Norway. Instead, we see that parts of canon law was adopted at one of the four 
regional public assemblies as Christian law,15 and served as a supplement to the vernacular 
laws of the respective region. Even though Canon law would more and more be applied the 
stronger the Church would become as an institution, it should be noticed that the Church in 
1277 issued yet another set of Christian law as an adoption of selected parts of Canon law. 
This time, though, we most assumed that the role of the public assemblies was just a formal 
one, as was the case with the royal codes of 1274 till 1281, and subsequent vernacular law 
making.  
 
In Norwegian legal history in the Middle Ages we find local law making in a local language. 
When King Håkon V in the preamble in 1302 claimed in Old Norse that Roman and Canon 
law had been harmful for the realm, and the laws to be observed by the inhabitants were those 
made by St. Olaf and his descendants to the throne, it was political propaganda, since Roman 
and canon law had influenced Norwegian law. But these sources of law had been much 
transformed what both content and language concerned. The idea of prescription was 
adopted,16 but without the idea of bona fides.17 But not only was Old Norse the legal language, 
but legal concepts like “decisio” was translated into “orskurð”,18 and “judex” to “rettari”. 
Through this kind of transformation law with universal aspiration was made culturally 
particular in Norway, as to various degrees everywhere in Europe, in the Middle Ages.  
 
3. Law with universal aspirations in the Early Modern Period 
The Reformation marks the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Early Modern 
Period. With the Reformation the relationship between man and God became more personal 
and less institutional, and the universal truths of Christendom were taught in different 
languages in the reformed areas of Europa. Similar changes would take place within law.  
 
First of all Roman and Canon law would become less influential. Canon law much due to the 
fact that it no longer applied universally within the western Christendom. Roman law much 
                                                 
14
 Mattila, Comparative Legal Linguistics, 131, with further referance.  
15
 These public assemblies was Gulating in western Norway, Frostating in the middle and north of Norway, 
Eidsivating in the interior east of Norway, and Borgarting in the coastal eastern Norway.  
16
 Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde, “Innovative reception – Reception and Innovation Concerning Fix time Periods as a 
Criterion for the Acqusition and Loss of Rights in the Gulating Compilation”, Liber amicorum Ditlev Tamm – 
Law, history and culture, eds. Per Andersen, Pia Letto-Vanamo, Kjell Åke Modéer, Helle Vogt (København: 
DJØF Publishing) 2011: 217-229.  
17
 See e.g. The Norwegian Code of the Realm VIII-6.  
18
 Knut Robberstad, Rettssoga, volume I (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget) 1976: 147.  
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due to the fact that the admiration for things antique was giving way for admiration for all 
things new, due to new discoveries and progress in so many fields. This was in itself not the 
end of law with universal aspirations. Natural law, which had since the Middle Ages been one 
of the many parts of law, moved forward to take their place. Being the law of mankind at all 
places at all times, it was as universal as could be. And the ground breaking treaty in natural 
law of 1625, “De jure belli ac pacis” by Hugo Grotius, was of course written in Latin – still 
the universal language. But if the word of God in general should ideally be transmitted in the 
languages of the particular states, then, should the laws of that state not also be transmitted in 
the languages of the legal subjects it applied to? As the German lawyer Herman Conrig would 
state in the early 17
th
 century: “Si lingua utaris aliena aut solis doctis nota, injurius es in 
populum “‒ you do harm to the people by using a foreign language or a language only known 
to the learned.  
 
Still, this universal truth was transmitted in a universal language and not one applied by the 
people in the first centuries after the Reformation.19 So even though e.g. German legal 
literature was written in German in the 17
th
 century, Latin still dominated.20 But by writing 
literature in German, aimed at an expanding student body including members of the lower 
bourgeoisie not mastering Latin, scholars like Christian Thomasius would pave the way for a 
new trend.21 It is symptomatic that Christian Wolff would write his pieces first in Latin, and 
later publish them in German, a strategic move securing his popularity as scholar and his 
personal wealth.  
 
But this new trend would also have a philosophical aspect to it. In this context it is more 
Wolff on the one hand would transmit his universal thruths in a universal language, which had 
been done since the Middle Ages. On the other hand he would transmit them in the specific 
language of a specific part of those possessing the universal reason making a reception of the 
universal thruths he was teaching possible. Wolff hence embodies the paradox of universality 
that emerges with the Enlightment – reason is universal by being a part of each individual, 
and must be awoked through theaching the individual, which must be done in a language the 
individual understands. Hence, suddenly a universal language was in the way of the 
universality of law.  
 
In the Danish-Norwegian kingdom laws were still made and applied in Danish, as had been 
the tradition since the Middle Ages. But learned law was thought in Latin at the University of 
Copenhagen from 1479. The consequence was that learned law had less impact on the law of 
the realm than local customs. This would come to an end when the law study was restructured 
in 1736 with inspiration from Prussia, where the architecht behind the restructuring, Andreas 
Højer, had studied under Thomasius during his stay in Halle between 1707 and 1710.22  
 
From 1736 on all who would take office as judge, prosecutor or advocate would have to first 
take a law exam. These exams were of four kinds when it came to content and language. The 
three highest degrees had to be taken in Latin, and required knowledge in Roman law to pass. 
The lowest degree was nicknamed the “Danish exam”, since it could be taken in Danish and 
with Danish and Norwegian law as its main focus. But the students were also tested in natural 
                                                 
19
 Mattilla, Comparative Legal Linguistics, 166 
20
 Op. cit.  
21
 See Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde, “Praecognita juris – eit danningsprogram i dansknorsk rettsvitskapleg litteratur på 
1700-talet”, Retfærd, no. 2/121 2008: 105-107. 
22
 Op. cit.: 105-106. 
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law.23 But being a kind of law that did not only apply to the learned but to everyone, a 
handbook in natural law had been available in Danish since 1715.24 The problem was rather 
that there was no literature on Danish-Norwegian law. Hence, students had to attend lectures, 
which were only held in Latin. The solution was that students with knowledge in the language 
would sit in at lectures, take notes, and translate them to Danish and finance their study that 
way. The first lectures translated into Danish were published in 1742.25 So was also reknown 
foreign literature like the Logica by Christian Wolf and De officio hominis et civis by Samuel 
Pufendorf. 26 It became obvious that there was a marked for legal literature in Danish, and 
from the 1750 and onwards such literature emerged together with even more translations. At 
the end of the 18
th
 century lectures was even held in Danish, and only dissertations was still in 
Latin till the 1840s. 
 
Latin was only the legal language of the university in Norwegian legal history from it 
emerged in 1479, but even here its importance would decline from the 1750s. As we have 
seen this was partly due to the emergence of a marked for legal litteratur in Danish.
27
 But 
there were another event at this time that would change how law was perceived for centuries 
to come: the publication of The Spirit of the Laws by Charles Montesquieu in 1748. 
Montesquieu`s work is much like Montaigne's Essays, but just all the essays at the same time 
in one big mix. But already in the beginning, before the reader gets entangled in the 
abundance of loose treads, we read: 
 
Laws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws 
of one nation can suit another. 
[…] 
They [laws] should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to the climate, be it freezing, torrid, or 
temperate; to the properties of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way of life of the peoples, be they 
plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they should relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can 
sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, 
their mores and their manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to their origin, to the purpose 
of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established.
28
  
 
Montesquieu adhered to the idea of natural law. But he found that this universal law was only 
the enterence to civil society, where natural law was only the raw material for particular law 
making.29 That law hence was made and applied differently at different places at different 
times without this making the law less good. Rather the contrary, it made it better, because it 
meant that law was adjusted to the natural environment and particular culture. 
 
                                                 
23
 Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde, “Fornuft og erfarenhed” – Framveksten av metodisk medvit i dansknorsk rett på 1700-
talet (Det juridiske fakultet: Bergen) 2007: 139-140. 
24
 Ludvig Holberg, Moralske Kierne, eller Introduction til Naturen og Folke-Rettens Kundskab, Uddragen af de 
fornemste Juristers, besynderlig Grotii, Pufendorfs og Thomasii Skrifter, Illustreret med Exempler af de 
Nordiske Historier, og confereret med vore Danske og Norske Love, Recesse og Forordninger (Kjøbenhavn: 
Johan Kruse) 1715. 
25
 Andreas Højer, Juridisk Collegium over Processen saaledes som den bruges i Dannemark og Norge, samlet 
og til Trykken befordret af Hans Hagerup (Kjøbenhavn) 1742. 
26 Christian Wolff, Fornuftige Tanker, om den menneskelige Forstands Kræfter, og dens rigtige Brug i at kiende 
Sandhed, Sandheds Elskere meddelte (Kjøbenhavn: Johan Jørgen Høpffner) 1742, and Samuel Pufendorf, Et 
menniskes og en Borgers Pligter efter Naturens Lov (Det Kongel. Waysenhuses Bogtrykkerie) 1742. 
27
 See Sunde, “Fornuft og erfarenhed”, 144-147. 
28
 Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge) 1990: 8-9.   
29
 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 6-7. 
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Montesquieu`s idea of good law being particular law hit Europe in the mid-18
th
 century hard. 
It was not because it was a totally new idea – as we have seen this idea was present in 
Etymologiae by Isidor of Sevilla, and it was influential on how Canon law was transmitted in 
the High Middle Ages. Rather the effect of the writing of Montesquieu was due to a long term 
change beginning with Conring, Thomasius and Wolff, and where the loss of a universal 
language of law was much the preparatory step towards the loss of law with universal 
aspirations. That is why the ideas of Motesquieu at this time became the decisive nail in the 
coffin of natural law.  
 
4. Particular law in the Modern Period 
If it is the adjustment to the particular that made law good, you can just as well do without the 
universal all together. The final move in this direction was made by Carl Friedrich von 
Savigny with his Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft of 1814. 
For Savigny good law was particular law that had to be organically developed in a symbiosis 
with the people governed by it: 
 
Aber dieser organische Zusammenhang des Rechts mit dem Wesen und Character des Volkes bewährt 
sich auch im Fortgang der Zeiten, und auch hierin ist es der Sprache zu vergleichen. So wie für diese, 
giebt es auch für das Recht keinen Augenblick eines absoluten Stillstandes, es ist derselben Bewegung 
und Entwicklung unterworfen, wie jede andere Richtung des Volkes, und auch diese Entwicklung steht 
unter demselben Gesetz innerer Nothwendigkeit, wie jene früheste Erscheinung. Das Recht wächst also 
mit dem Volke fort, bildet sich aus mit diesem, und stirbt endlich ab, so wie das Volk seine 
Eigenthümlichkeit verliert.
30
 
 
In Norway both Montesquieu and Savigny were particularly influential due to the strong 
tradition of adjustment of law since the Middle Ages, but also to political circumstances. 
Since the reformation Norway was tightly knit to the Danish kingdom, and Norwegian law 
was produced in Copenhagen, being the capital of the Danish-Norwegian kingdom. Often 
Danish law was just made Norwegian law. But Danish and Norwegian natural and cultural 
particularities were far from always the same, and Montesquieu gave Norwegian lawyers a 
legitimate reason for doing what they had long done – adjust Danish law to Norwegian 
conditions. From 1814 on Norway had a joint king with Sweden instead of Denmark, but with 
the important difference that Norwegian law was now made by a Norwegian parliament. 
Savigny gave this parliament a legitimate reason to fight for its supremacy as law maker and 
to resist the initiatives by the king, seated in Stockholm, to reduce its powers.  
 
Savigny spoke of the organic development of law and people. And his teaching was used in a 
Norwegian context to resist the influence of a king experienced as Swedish on the powers of 
parliament. It sounds like the autocratic law with universal aspirations had had to give way to 
the particular and democratically founded law. It is not quite so. Savigny, as Norwegian 
lawyers in the 19
th
 century, would use customs as a source of law. But they would separate 
customs for customary law, the latter being customs that lawyers would find suitable as a 
source of law. Law, like language, music, fairy tales, etc. as used by the people was at best a 
raw material for jurists to polish, at worse misconduct to be abandoned. Hence, the practice of 
the people would only have the force of law if lawyers would not reshape or sensor it all 
together. 
 
                                                 
30
 Carl Friedrich von, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Heidelberg: Mohr & 
Zimmer 1814: 11.) 
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Still, at least Norwegian became the language of the law. Also not quite so. Because what was 
actually the Norwegian language? Danish had been so since Old Norse was no longer 
comprehensible to all but a very small elite from the 16
th
 century on. The Norwegian language 
was hence in 1814 Danish. But this was not the tongue spoken among the people. With 
nynorsk, a language based on the spoken dialects, a Norwegian language was constructed to 
compete with bokmål, the language found in books and only spoken by the elite. In 1885, 
after the political takeover by the political party Venstre, with a sound rural base, nynorsk was 
made an official Norwegian language together with bokmål. In 1894 the first draft of a law in 
nynorsk was voted on in the Norwegian parliament. The law was on only two paragraphs, 
aimed at introducing Greenwich Mean Time in Norway, and its content was not controversial 
at all. But the language was. Among other things, it was claimed that nynorsk was a very 
suitable language to discuss agricultural affairs and fishery, but not stately affairs like laws. 
The law just got a majority, and another 27 years would pass before a new law in nynorsk was 
voted on. By that time the first professor in law using nynorsk got his chair in 1906, but he 
wrote bokmål up till then. The first student took his exam using nynorsk in 1909, but he barely 
passed, even though the exam would have been good if it had been written in a human 
language, as the examiner put it. The student became in the 1930s the first judge at the first 
instance to write nynorsk. About thirty years later this was done for the first time in an appeal 
court, and in the Supreme Court the first vota in nynorsk were written in 1999.31  
 
5. A universal truth about law? 
There has been a conflict in European legal history the last a thousand years between law with 
universal aspirations accompanied with a universal language, and particular law accompanied 
with particular languages. It is hence tempting to make the two fit into a dichotomy of 
national and international. This was done already in the preamble of the statute of 1302. 
Today what is universal and what is particular might even more easily be trapped in this 
dichotomy because of the notion of the nation state as the normal state of affairs. And this is 
especially the case using Norway as an example, or other present day nations that have a long 
history of being one, fairly unified territory since the Middle Ages.  
 
But the strife between nynorsk and bokmål as legal languages in Norway since the midst of 
the 19
th
 century reminds us that this dichotomy is not a question of national versus 
international, even if it might be so. Rather it is an immanent feature of law that we strive to 
include as many legal subjects and as much territory as possible in jurisdictions, because 
shared law enables interaction. On the other hand we strive to make law as closely linked to 
the persons and the affairs governed by law, because the purpose of law is to solve conflicts, 
and the most lasting conflict resolutions are those that the legal subjects can best understand 
by being specific and not general. This immanens is unleashed in the strife between law with 
universal aspirations and particular law. It is hence not a question of law as good or bad, but 
of both factors having to be weighed against each other to strike a balance.  
 
In this continuous evaluation process we find a creative force within law. The difference 
between the decisions in Chamber and Grand Chamber in Lautsi and Others v. Italy are hence 
not a proof of the European Court of Justice not working well, but that it takes part in this 
creative process law has profited from the last thousand years.  
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